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Abstract: How Moore’s open question argument works, insofar as it does, remains a
matter of controversy. My purpose here is to construct an open question argument based
on a novel interpretation of how Moore’s argument might work. In order to sidestep
exegetical questions, I do not claim here to be offering Moore’s own argument. Rather, I
offer a reconstruction making use of important elements of Moore’s methodology and
assumptions that could be reasonable within a Moorean viewpoint. The crucial role within
the argument is played by what I call the real thought move. I show that the reconstructed
argument is more defensible from some standard objections than the common
construction. I finish by drawing attention to a neglected objective that would make sense
within Moore’s viewpoint, showing that it fits with a major commitment of Bonjour’s
moderate rationalism, and show how the package might be important for the non-
naturalist today.
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1 Introduction
At the beginning of Principia Ethica Moore offers an argument for the simplicity and
indefinability of good, an argument that has come to be known as the open question
argument. The structure of the argument as a whole, given in §13 of the first chapter, is
that of an argument by exhaustion. Moore considers three possibilities, that good is
complex, meaningless or simple, and intends to establish the last by eliminating the first
two. §13(1) is mainly directed at complexity and §13(2) is directed initially, and rather
obscurely, towards meaninglessness before turning to arguing that in being simple, good
is not identical to what we mean by some other simple term.
Exactly how Moore’s open question argument works, insofar as it does, remains a
matter of controversy. On some views, although Moore may have pointed at something
important, what he got right we have absorbed in other terms, and in any case, it was not
really in or through the argument that he got it right (Darwall et al 1992, Darwall 2003,
Horgan and Timmons 2006). I disagree. I think the argument brings into view (perhaps
somewhat obscurely) something that remains important. And so does Fred Feldman, if I
understand him aright. To my mind, Feldman shows that Moore’s open question argument
has been misrepresented in a certain respect. I shall not reiterate his points but remark
only that I concur with his analysis so far as it goes.
In this paper I start by defending Moore from some of the things Feldman faults him for
before turning to my main contributions. I shall suggest that the weight commonly placed
on the openness of questions is not a good way of understanding how the argument works.
Instead, I shall explain the crucial role played by what I call the real thought move and
reject the analysis of this move in terms of open versus closed questions. I shall show how
this move plays a significant role in every part of the argument, how it strengthens the
argument by avoiding the obscurities of open questions, and how it makes sense of
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several steps made by Moore that are mysterious when understood in terms of the
openness of questions. I shall then offer a reconstruction of the argument based on this
suggestion, making use of important elements of Moore’s methodology and making
assumptions that could be reasonable within a Moorean viewpoint.
In offering the reconstruction I am not claiming to give an exegesis of what Moore
really meant and so this paper is not intended as a contribution to Moorean scholarship.
To the extent to which my reconstruction is indeed in line with Moore’s intentions, to that
extent he originates the reconstruction. Nevertheless, the scholar’s question of whether
these are really Moore’s intentions or methodology or assumptions is not germane to the
purpose of the paper.
Having given the reconstructed open question argument, I shall discuss some standard
objections and their application to the reconstruction and move on to drawing attention to
a neglected objective that would make sense within Moore’s viewpoint. The methodology
deployed in setting up the argument leads us further than has generally been attended to,
to what I call the real objective. My suggestion is that what Moore was reaching for does
not depend on the success of the argument but on drawing to our attention our
acquaintance with goodness itself. We shall see that this acquaintance is of precisely the
kind to which Bonjour has committed himself in his defence of rationalism for a priori
justification. I shall finish by arguing that the real objective may yet be significant by
showing how it is a commitment difficult for non-naturalists to avoid if they are to sustain
a substantive moral realism that is distinct from non-reductive synthetic naturalism.
2 Defence from faults
Feldman faults Moore for what he calls four preliminary problems: being ‘oblivious to
the use/mention distinction’, oblivious to the distinction between a predicate and general
term of abstract reference (‘…is good’ v ‘goodness’), failing to ‘appreciate the difference
between the ‘is’ of identity and the ‘is’ of predication’ and inconsistency ‘in his use of
linguistic terminology…such...as ‘denote’, ‘mean’,…’ (Feldman 2005, 24-26).
To the ear of modern philosophers, trained to appreciate the philosophical importance
of such distinctions (a training which exists in large part because of the direction Moore’s
own work gave to philosophy), it may sound as if Moore is making these errors.
Nevertheless, I think this is a mistake. The first mistake is evident if we attend to what he
says about the sense of ‘definition’ he is concerned with and also what he says in §13(2).
Moore makes clear in §8 that the kind of definition he is discussing is neither a
stipulation nor a dictionary note of the use of a word. Rather, in giving a definition
We may mean that a certain object, which we all of us know, is composed in
a certain manner…all of them arranged in definite relations to one another.
It is in this sense that I deny good to be definable. I say that it is not
composed of any parts, which we can substitute for it in our minds when we
are thinking of it. We might think just as clearly and correctly about a horse,
if we thought of all its parts and their arrangement instead of thinking of the
whole: we could, I say, think how a horse differed from a donkey just as
well, just as truly, in this way, as now we do, only not so easily; but there is
nothing whatsoever which we could substitute for good; and that is what I
mean, when I say that good is indefinable. (Moore 1903, §8)
In this sense of definition, Moore takes it that we are not speaking merely of the word or
concept, but speaking of what it is that is whatever the word is about. We might call this a
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substantive or metaphysical definition. The point is, that what good is is what we mean by
good when that meaning is considered in this sense of a definition. We would express this
more fussily today in terms of goodness being what we mean by ‘good’. But, as this
passage makes clear, that Moore did not express it fussily does not mean he is oblivious to
the aforementioned distinctions. Indeed, understanding the sense of definition he is
concerned with depends precisely on appreciating those distinctions. Furthermore, he
need only attend to linguistic terminology to the degree necessary for his discussion of the
substantive definition of good that is his concern. Since he has told us clearly that this is
his concern, I cannot agree that Moore’s ‘use of linguistic terminology….is hard to
fathom’ (Feldman 2005, 26).
Finally, consider the following passage:
It is very natural to make the mistake of supposing that what is universally
true is of such a nature that its negation would be self-contradictory…. And
thus it is very easy to conclude that what seems to be a universal ethical
principle is in fact an identical proposition (Moore 1903, §13(2))
Moore’s criticism of a specific error in understanding or inference depends precisely on
distinguishing the ‘is’ of identity and the ‘is’ of predication. He is suggesting that we can
mistake a true universal proposition for logically necessary truth. For example, if we
mistake ‘pleasure is good’ in this way, instead of taking the ‘is’ to be the copula,
predicating goodness of whatever is pleasurable, we will take it to be the identity sign,
taking goodness and pleasure to be one and the same property. There is a complication
here, because his opponent might regard such moral principles as not merely universally
true but necessarily true. Yet even so, it remains controversial whether (as we would put it
today) necessary coextension of properties implies identity of properties.
3 Challenging the open question in the open question argument
The idea of an open question has long been thought to play an essential role in Moore’s
argument. The argument itself is given in §13 (Moore 1903, 15–17) and does not speak of
an open question. Instead, the term is introduced later as a way we might cut someone
short: ‘This is not an open question: the very meaning of the word decides it’ (Moore
1903, §14). It is understandable why that later term has been linked back and Moore at
least sometimes seems to have intended the openness of a question to play the role that
has been attributed to it.
Standard objections have faulted the argument by denying the open question is truly
open, or denying it can play the role attributed to it. Frankena (1939) suggest that the
argument begs the question. Fumerton (1983) argues that the paradox of analysis
undermines the inference from the question being open to the failure of an analytic
relation (see more below). Similarly, recent defences, such as Strandberg (2004) and
Altman (2004), also assume that the openness of a question is playing an essential role
and have sought to show that the open question does, in fact, succeed in its role in the
argument.
Here I challenge the view that the open question plays an essential role. I suggest that
the openness of a question is dispensable and that the question being a question plays its
role in the argument in another way, a way that I will explain and argue for in the next
section. Consequently, I think the name by which Moore’s argument is known is
misleading.
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I shall concede the temptation to give it a continuing role, but suggest that that role is
not central. It merely adds support to a claim that is primarily otherwise supported and so
need not depend on that support. I shall also show how the openness of a question cannot
play a role in several places in the argument which, if it were playing an essential role, it
would have to play. I shall call such failures of the openness of questions the
incompetence of openness.
4 The real thought move
The view I am challenging construes that part of the argument directed against the
complexity of the good (§13(1)) as, in essence, ‘whether what we desire to desire is good
is an open question therefore good does not mean what we desire to desire’. So construed,
we are led off into the obscure questions about what makes a question open or closed and
what kind of entailments a question being open have for the nature of what is being
queried.
Although there is a move in Moore’s argument that it might be useful to refer to as the
open question move, the move itself is not expressed as a question being open and I shall
argue that what is held to follow need have nothing to do with what may or may not
follow from a question being open.
The move I am thinking of is not discussed by Feldman. Feldman instead starts later,
with Moore’s contrast of the question of whether it is good to desire to desire A and
whether the desire to desire A is one of the things we desire to desire. I agree with
Feldman’s analysis of how the argument then proceeds (see Feldman 2005, 32):
essentially, by pointing out that these are distinct questions and then, given
compositionality of meaning, validly inferring that ‘to be good may mean to be that which
we desire to desire’ (Moore 1903, §13(1)) is false. So here what does the work is not (the
much controverted issue of) what it is for a question to be open or closed and what
follows from that, but the metaphysical question of the identity or distinction of questions.
The move in question is necessary both to set up the contrast just mentioned and to
vindicate the methodology by which the distinction of the two questions is established. It
is made when Moore says:
if we carry the investigation further, and ask ourselves ‘“Is it good to desire
to desire A?”’ it is apparent, on a little reflection, that this question is itself
as intelligible, as the original question, ‘“Is A good?”’ (1903, §13(1))
This, I think, is the source of the view I am challenging and of the discussions which
attempt to clarify the notion of an open question with thoughts about the intelligibility of
questions. But what is going on here and in the further argument need have nothing to do
with it being an open question whether what we desire to desire is good. It is more simple
than that, and its role is clearer when we see the basis on which Moore argues for the
distinction between the questions:
it is also apparent that the meaning of this second question cannot be
correctly analysed into “Is the desire to desire A one of the things which we
desire to desire?”: we have not before our minds anything so complicated as
the question “Do we desire to desire to desire to desire A?” (1903, §13(1))
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So the distinction of the questions is taken to be established by bringing two token
thoughts to mind and comparing them for identity or distinction of type. For that to be
right requires two items of self-knowledge of mental states: that I have thoughts before
my mind and that they are distinct. Moore assumes that provided I have thoughts before
my mind, two things follow. Not only is their identity or distinction evident (which could
also be the case if one was meaningful and one meaningless) but also we can make valid
comparative inferences about the meanings of the whole thoughts and the parts of which
they are composed. He implicitly acknowledges that we can be deceived over whether we
have a thought before the mind; we may merely feel like we do when entertaining a
sequence of verbiage. It is to this last point that I believe the move is directed: simply to
establishing that in entertaining whether what I desire to desire is good I actually have a
thought in mind. That the question is intelligible is sufficient: whether it is open or not is
irrelevant. The mere fact of intelligibility guarantees that I have a real thought in mind and
am not self-deceived in thinking I do. For these reasons let’s call it the real thought move.
So the real thought move is necessary for the inference that the evident distinction is
not that between a thought and a mere appearance of a thought, but between thoughts of
different meaning. It is only on that basis that compositionality then allows us to trace the
difference in meaning between the thoughts to the difference in meaning of specific
constituents of the thoughts.
There is a subtlety at this point in how the argument has established that good is not
complex. Two things are going on here. The first is an appeal to self knowledge: that by
direct comparison of the token thoughts, it is drawn to our attention that one constituent is
complex and one is not, hence complexity alone does the work. But the inference to the
good being simple need not depend on this additional piece of self-knowledge. It is
supported by the detail of the case used for Moore’s example, detail which also addresses
a worry about that self knowledge, viz. that we might instead be mistaking comparatively
lesser and greater complexity for the simple versus the complex.1 Moore considers an
analysis in terms of two simples (or perhaps I should say a repeated simple, namely,
desire) and therefore we have a comparison of good with a putative analysis of minimal
complexity. Since it is complexity alone, rather than the conceptual content, that identifies
the distinction in meaning, we can infer from the example’s instance of complexity to
complexity in general; and since the case is one of minimal complexity, the inference
from the distinction in meaning to the distinction between the simple and the complex is
valid.
So once the real thought move is achieved, the argument may then validly proceed from
the distinction of the thoughts being evident to the thinker. Baldwin objects that this last
must assume
that the structure of thoughts is transparently accessible to their thinker, and
this is a Cartesian assumption which there is reason to reject. Thinkers are as
fallible about the nature of their own thoughts as about their physical
environment. (1990, 63)
The objection, however, applies to an assumption about self-knowledge stronger than is
needed. It should be noted that Moore himself acknowledge the fallibility of the self-
knowledge to which he is appealing when he later says:
1 My thanks to an anonymous referee for raising this worry.
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although he may never become aware at all that it is different from other
notions of which he is also aware. (1903, 17)
Furthermore, that the real thought move is itself directed at an element of our fallibility is
a proof that infallible self-knowledge is not being assumed. With the real thought move in
view we see that what is assumed is neither general transparency nor infallibility, but only
that when taking appropriate care with not especially sophisticated thoughts using familiar
concepts, the difference in complexity is apparent to the thinker. By contrast, for this kind
of objection to succeed requires not merely that such self-knowledge is fallible but that it
is never available.
At this point I wish to make the above mentioned concession. As we have seen, the
appeal to intelligibility need only be making the real thought move. Of course,
‘intelligibility’ may also be taken in the sense that has been used in the common
interpretation of the argument as dependent on the openness of questions.2 That is to say,
it might be taken in the sense that is supposed to distinguish an open question being
intelligible from a closed question not being intelligible.
We can now see that intelligibility doesn’t have to be taken in the latter sense and the
argument is stronger for doing so. Nevertheless, and this is my concession, that they are
distinct questions may also be supported by whatever can be made of the openness of
questions, and certainly this additional support makes the distinction claim stronger.3 But
equally, the claim does not depend on that support and nor need that support be the central
basis of the claim in how the argument works. This is a good thing since whatever
concerns we may raise about the identity and distinction of thoughts, what that difference
amounts to is simple, definite and absolute, whereas the difference between openness or
closedness of questions has been found to be elusive, obscure and possibly relative.4
Consequently, to base the distinction of thought claim on the openness claim is to ask the
elusive and obscure to underpin the simple and definite, which is hard enough, and the
relative to underpin the absolute, which is prima facie impossible.
That the openness claim is not the central basis is additionally proved by what I shall
now show. The real thought move also makes sense of the steps made by Moore at the end
of §13(1) and the beginning of §13(2) that are only dubiously understood in terms of the
openness of questions.5 For this reason reconstructing the argument on the basis of the
real thought move makes the argument stronger that it would otherwise be.
The steps at the end of §13(1): The real thought move is underpinning the second
argument given in the long final sentence of §13(1). In this sentence Moore gives clear
indication that he is assuming compositionality of meaning, since what is shown ‘by
inspection’ of two whole propositions is that ‘the predicate of this proposition—“good”—
is positively different from the notion of “desiring to desire”’ (1903, §13(1)). Here, ‘by
inspection’, we doubt the equivalence of ‘that we should desire to desire A is good’ and
‘that A should be good is good’. Then ‘the mere fact that we understand very well what is
2 The earlier use of ‘significance’ on page 15 can also be taken in both ways, although its use
there, perhaps, gives greater support to construing Moore’s own argument as making essential use
of the openness of questions.
3 My thanks to an anonymous referee for pointing this out.
4 Compare ‘Identity is utterly simple’ (Lewis 1986, 192). Found obscure despite (or even because
of, if Quine 1951 is right) Moore’s initial expression apparently basing it in analyticity. More on
relativity in §6.
5 My thanks to an anonymous referee for suggesting that this point be given more prominence.
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meant by doubting [the equivalence] shews clearly that we have two different notions
before our minds’ (1903, §13(1)).
This argument is valid given the compositionality of meaning. Its major premiss is got
once again from what is evident ‘by inspection’ on having the token thoughts before the
mind. In so doing it relies explicitly on the real thought move establishing that we do
indeed have thoughts before the mind, rather than mere appearances of thoughts, in order
for inspection to establish their non-equivalence.
The openness of questions is playing no explicit role at all here, since what are being
inspected are not questions. It is also possible that the real thought moves contributes
indirectly as well as explicitly, i.e. via the question’s intelligibility, in the establishing-a-
real-thought sense, supporting the realness of the corresponding non-questioning thought
here. But if we try to extract indirect support from the openness of the corresponding
question, we are in trouble. The openness of the question is, at least arguably, logically
posterior to the doubting. I say at least arguably because, once again, this takes us into the
obscurity concerning the openness of questions. This failure of the openness of questions
to explain or validate this part of the argument is an incompetence of openness.
The real thought move also plays a significant role in the steps at the beginning of
§13(2). The first time it is made is our second example of the incompetence of openness.
Given the opening remarks of §13, we are expecting §13(1) to have ruled out complexity
and §13(2) to rule out meaninglessness. Yet the very first sentence of §13(2) states that
‘the same consideration is sufficient to dismiss the hypothesis that ‘good’ has no meaning
whatsoever’ (Moore 1903, §13(2)). Because this is initially puzzling Feldman concludes
that Moore:
muddies the waters first by suggesting that he is talking about theories
according to which ‘good’ has no meaning whatsoever. Surely, he meant to
say that he is talking about naturalistic theories according to which ‘good’
has no definition whatsoever (2005, 35).
This, I think, is a mistake. First, Feldman seems to think Moore is speaking of what we
would now call non-reductive naturalist theories. That is unlikely, and the issue of such
theories we shall return to later. Second, it is true that what Moore says in the rest of the
section is not addressed to the meaninglessness option. Nevertheless, at the beginning of
§13 he states quite simply that the alternative to complexity or simplicity is that good
‘might have no meaning at all’ (1903, §13), a remark closely echoed in the first sentence
of section 13(2). If Feldman were right this echo would indeed be an example of the
inconsistency of linguistic terminology for which he faults Moore. But he isn’t right.
Moore intends to rule out meaninglessness before turning to eliminating a final possibility
not enumerated earlier: that good is identical to what we mean by some other simple term.
We can see this if we attend to what consideration is supposed to be sufficient to
dismiss the hypothesis of meaninglessness. He is referring back to ‘that we understand
very well what is meant by doubting’ the equivalence of the propositions ‘that we should
desire to desire A is good’ and ‘that A should be good is good’. Recall that what he takes
this to be showing is the distinction of the predicates ‘good’ and ‘desire to desire’. This
distinction might yet be merely a matter of the first being meaningless and the second
meaningful, so his conclusion that they are distinct is not on its own sufficient to show
‘good’ to be meaningful. It is, rather, the precise methodology of showing the distinction
that proves it.
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The non-identity of the two propositions is evident ‘by inspection’ provided we are not
mistaken about whether we actually have the thoughts, and it is the real thought move that
underwrites this assumption. Earlier we took it that compositionality was sufficient to get
from the distinction in thought to non-identity of the meaning of good with the meaning
of a complex. But to establish meaningfulness requires a further assumption. We need in
addition that to have real thoughts requires their predicative constituent parts to be
meaningful. Then, based on the success of the real thought move as applied in the
doubting case, the distinction in thoughts shows ‘good’ to be meaningful. With this in
mind, it is equally clear that the distinction in questions will suffice for dismissing the
meaninglessness hypothesis. So, just as in the dismissal of complexity, the real thought
move is essential to establishing the major premiss in the argument against the
meaninglessness of ‘good’. Indeed, without the real thought move we cannot make any
sense of Moore’s dismissal of meaninglessness.
The real thought move is equally essential to the final part of Moore’s argument, in
which he considers and dismisses the possibility that good is identical to what we mean
by some other simple term.
Every one does in fact understand the question “Is this good?” When he
thinks of it, his state of mind is different from what it would be, were he
asked “Is this pleasant, or desired, or approved?” (1903, 16–17)
From here we have essentially the same argument as the one addressed to complexity: the
distinction in questions is evident to us provided we have the two thoughts, and given
compositionality of meaning non-identity of the meaning of the relevant constituents
follows. Once again the main premiss is established by the real thought move, which
assures us that the difference in state of mind is that between distinct thoughts rather than
between a thought and a mere seeming of a thought.
5 The reconstructed open question argument
Now, with the real thought move in mind, we can reconstruct the argument thus:
1. ‘Good’ denotes something either complex, meaningless or simple.
2. Suppose good is complex, e.g. good is what we desire to desire.
3. ‘When we think that A is good we are thinking that A is one of the things which
we desire to desire’ (Moore 1903, §13(1)).
4. ‘if…we ask ourselves “is it good to desire to desire A?”…this question is
intelligible’(1903, §13(1))
5. On the supposed analysis of good, this intelligible question is identical to the
question ‘Is the desire to desire A one of the things which we desire to desire?’
(1903, §13(1)).
6. Since the question is intelligible, when we bring the two different question tokens
before our mind each token is a real thought rather than either being meaningless.
7. Any distinction between real thoughts is a distinction in meaning rather than a
distinction between the meaningful and the meaningless.
8. So comparison of the tokens is a legitimate comparison of their meanings.
9. Making the comparison, it is evident that in entertaining the first token ‘we have
not before our minds anything so complicated as’ (1903, §13(1)) what we have
before our minds in entertaining the second token.
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10. So the tokens do not mean the same.
11. Since meaning is compositional, and since the difference between the tokens is
constituted by the difference between predicating ‘being good’ and predicating
‘being one of the things which we desire to desire’ then ‘one can easily convince
himself by inspection that the predicate of this proposition—“good”—is
positively different from the notion of “desiring to desire” which enters into its
subject’ (1903, §13(1)).
12. Because the difference in meaning detected is a difference in complexity, the
contrast being with a case of minimal complexity, and since it was the complexity
alone that exhibited the difference in meaning, ‘good’ does not denote something
complex.
13. Furthermore, that we can understand what is meant by doubting whether what we
desire to desire is always good ‘shews clearly we have two different notions
before out minds’(1903, §13(1)).
14. ‘And the same consideration [i.e. that we are entertaining real thoughts entails
that the difference in notions is a distinction in meaning rather than between the
meaningful and meaningless] is sufficient to dismiss the hypothesis that ‘good’
has no meaning whatsoever.’ (1903, §13(2)).
15. So good is neither complex nor meaningless and is therefore simple.
16. It is tempting to mistake ‘a universal ethical principle [for]…an identical
proposition….for example [in the case of ] “Pleasure is the good”’ (1903, §13(2))
[i.e. confuse the ‘is’ of predication for the ‘is’ of identity].
17. One might thereby think that ‘good’ denotes a simple denoted by another word
such as, for example, ‘pleasant’.
18. ‘But whoever will attentively consider…what is actually before his mind when he
asks…”Is pleasure…after all good?’ can easily satisfy himself that he is not
merely wondering whether pleasure is pleasant’(1903, §13(2)).
19. And likewise, when we think of the question ‘is this good?’ our ‘state of mind is
different from what it would be’ when we think of ‘is this pleasant or desired or
approved?’ (1903, §13(2)).
20. In each case the intelligibility of the question shows we have a real thought in
mind and so, since meaning is compositional, the distinction in thought proves
distinction in meanings.
21. So ‘good’ denotes something simple and unanalysable that is not identical to
simples denoted by terms such as ‘pleasant’ etc.
Note that lines 16 and 17 are not strictly speaking part of the argument, but an aside
explaining why the final steps are taken.
I think it is evident that Moore could adopt this reconstruction should he choose to do
so. Nevertheless, since from hereon I shall need to repeatedly distinguish the
reconstruction from constructions of the open question argument that take the openness of
questions to be essential to the argument, I shall call the latter type Moore’s argument.
6 The reconstruction and standard objections
We might now wonder whether the reconstruction is any better at resisting the standard
objections than Moore’s argument. I am not here going to work through all available
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objections but offer rebuttals against two standard objections and a response to a third in a
way that leads to the final section, in which I discuss whether the reconstructed argument
has a continuing significance for non-naturalism.
The paradox of analysis is this: Apparently, analyses cannot be both true and
informative because if true they must be trivial; and yet surely some analyses are both true
and informative.6 The problem it poses is this. Suppose XYZ is a true and informative
analysis of A. Being informative entails that whether A is XYZ is an open question to the
uninformed. Being true entails that A does in fact mean XYZ. Consequently, if there are
true informative analyses, being an open question does not suffice to prove distinctness of
meaning. So the open question argument that relies on the openness of questions requires
there to be no true informative analyses. Fumerton puts the paradox forward as a
diagnosis:
This explains what is wrong with Moore's open question argument. You
cannot justifiably conclude that two questions do not have the same meaning
because the one strikes you as significant, while the other strikes you as
trivial. (1983, 492)
As Fumerton runs it, true informative analyses are possible because there may be
‘different-level meaning rule[s]’ (1983, 491) that constitute an identity of meaning, but of
which we are not aware. We can be informed by becoming conscious of, and of the
relation of, the different level rules. Consequently, what is open for one person might be
closed for another, and this makes the openness of a question relative rather than
absolute.7
So the paradox of analysis objection is powerful against Moore’s argument. It is so
because it undermines the claim that when we detect an open question, the predicates
involved are not related analytically. Nevertheless, the objection can be rebutted by the
point that true substantive definitions are only transitorily informative. Once we have
been informed, and come to understand it clearly, the analysis now seems trivial and the
question no longer appears open (hence the relativity of the openness of questions).
In the case of attempted analyses of ‘good’, being informed of putative analyses does
not result in the question closing, and hence the objection fails. Admittedly, some
naturalists will insist that it does close. Others, however, will say that it does not close for
them. Yet, if it is a true analysis, they must already be in possession of the concepts, such
as in terms of Fumerton’s different-level meaning rules, so once they clearly understand
it, it should close for them. This can be taken further of course, but for our purposes we
merely note that in this apparent stand-off we have now met some of the obscurity of the
openness of questions. So this objection is not a clear defeater of Moore’s argument.
Insofar as our reconstruction does not depend on the openness of questions, this
objection struggles to get a grip. To apply it to our reconstruction it would have to attack
our self-knowledge of the distinctness of thoughts. But of course, the objection itself
assumes the very same thing assumed in the reconstruction, that the identity and
distinction of thoughts is to some extent within our self-knowledge. Only in this way can
we become informed by being told of the analysis. We must come to see that the thoughts
that were apparently distinct are in fact identical. In Fumerton’s example, we do this by
6 Baldwin (1990, 209) attributes the paradox itself to Moore, but Langford (1942) is where it first
appears in print.
7 Here I meet the promissory note given in §4.
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seeing that different-level meaning rules amount to an identity of meaning where we
previously thought there was a distinction. So the objection cannot attack the possibility
of our simply knowing the thoughts to be distinct. It can only insist that a true informative
analysis may bring to light that we are mistaken in thinking certain thoughts distinct. This
is much weaker than the attack on Moore’s argument furnished by undermining the
openness of questions as a criterion of the distinctness of meaning. In reply, the analogous
rebuttal can be given: that the appearance of a distinction in thought should then be
transitory and pass when the putative analysis is understood, but it is not transitory. This
reply is stronger to the extent that the attack itself is weaker.
Frankena, in his paper about the naturalistic fallacy, is widely thought to have shown
that Moore begged the question in his open question argument.
Moore brings an invalid argument type into view in §13(2):
It is very natural to make the mistake of supposing that what is universally
true is of such a nature that its negation would be self-contradictory: the
importance which has been assigned to analytic propositions in the history
of philosophy shews how easy such a mistake is. And thus it is very easy to
conclude that what seems to be a universal ethical principle is in fact an
identical proposition; that, if, for example, whatever is called “good” seems
to be pleasant, the proposition “Pleasure is the good” does not assert a
connection between two different notions, but involves only one, that of
pleasure.
Frankena’s responds:
while it is true that it is an error to construe a universal synthetic proposition
as a definition, it is a petitio for the intuitionist to say that what the
[naturalist] is taking for a definition is really a universal synthetic
proposition (1939, 474)
Moore may appear to be doing this in §13(2), but if we consider the import of his remarks
in §9, especially the distinction between good, the property, and the good, the extension of
the property, there is a better interpretation. There is an invalid argument type, and an easy
way of falling into the fallacy, that Moore thinks naturalists deploy in arguing for their
naturalism, of which he gives an instance:
1. ‘whatever is…good [is] pleasant’ (and nothing else is)
2. Therefore ‘Pleasure is the good’
The argument is valid if the conclusion is a universal proposition (characterising the
extension of goodness) but not if the distinction between the good and good is ignored
and it is taken as a statement of identity. So, yes, a naturalist might instead offer this
conclusion not as a conclusion but as a definition of the identity of properties, in which
case Moore would be begging the question, but Frankena is really missing Moore’s point.
Furthermore, this discussion by Moore is not part of the open question argument itself.8
Its role is not to prove that good is distinct from any simple natural property, but only to
8 See my remark at the end of §5 about lines 16 and 17 of the reconstructed argument.
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block a fallacious argument for identifying good with a simple natural property. Only then
does he turn to proving its distinction from any simple natural property. If at this point the
naturalist abjures the fallacy and turns instead to stating that he defines good to be
pleasure, even if we now take Moore’s discussion to be begging the question against that
definition, the naturalist is begging the question as well.
So Frankena is missing the point twice over and we must look elsewhere for where
Moore’s argument is supposed to be begging the question. The only other accusation of
question begging from Frankena is this:
it is begging the question in favour of intuitionism to say in advance that the
quality goodness is indefinable and that therefore all naturalists commit the
definist fallacy. One must know that goodness is indefinable before one can
argue that the definist fallacy is a fallacy. (1939, 473)9
This is true enough, so far as it goes. But it seems to construe Moore’s arguments as
consisting only in this
1. Naturalists define good as a natural property
2. Good is indefinable
3. Therefore naturalists are committing the naturalistic (=definist) fallacy
But of course, Moore spends section 13 arguing for the very proposition that Frankena
accuses him of assuming. Frankena doesn’t address the argument of section 13 nor does
he explain where the question begging occurs in it. The closest we get is the remark:
The issue….is one of inspection or intuition and concerns the awareness or
discernment of qualities and relations. That is why it cannot be decided by
the use of the notion of a fallacy (1939, 475)
Moore, however, has never said that the issue is decided by the notion of a fallacy. He is
simply giving a name to a mistake he thinks naturalists commit, suggesting that its source
may be the kind of fallacious argument or confusion he explained. He is not claiming
thereby to have proved that it is a mistake. The proof, if it is one, is in §13.
Moore’s argument, and our reconstruction, do indeed appeal to inspection and the self-
knowledge involved may indeed be intuition, in Moore’s sense of things known but not
provable (see Moore 1903, §§37, 46, 65 and Moore 1939). In the case of Moore’s
argument, it is the openness of questions that is intuitive. A question being open does
seem to imply that the predicates involved do not define one another and vice versa so
perhaps they are logically equivalent. For this reason Frankena may think that the
openness of questions assumes the indefinability of good. Yet it would not amount to
begging the question unless an assumption of the indefinability of good had been offered
as the reason to believe the question open. That, however, is not what is going on: that the
question is open is offered as an intuition rather than knowledge got by an inference.10
9 On the previous page there is also an instance of this mentioned with respect to a Mr Perry.
10 In general, just because P is logically equivalent to Q does not mean giving P as a reason for Q
is question begging: one would need also to be giving Q as the reason for P. My thanks to an
anonymous referee for asking about this.
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Certainly, something about whether the question ‘Is pleasure good?’ is open or not may
invite thought about the definability of good, so one can see why the suspicion might
arise. For example, if, when we want to analyse, explain or further support openness, we
give up the intuition, then we may fall into a circularity by basing openness on
indefinability. So the various obscurities of openness that invite further scrutiny may
inadvertently lead us into a subtle assumption of indefinability when confronting the
question of openness.
Nevertheless, the accusation from Frankena is that ‘it is begging the question in favour
of intuitionism to say in advance that the quality goodness is indefinable’ (1939, 473), not
that it is begging the question by saying that the question is open. Provided the latter is
offered as an intuition, not from an inference, the accusation taken in this way is not well
made out. That being said, we must grant that the continuing obscurities of openness must
leave this challenge to Moore’s argument not fully settled
In the case of our reconstruction, however, the matter is much clearer. Here we assume
only that the distinction of thoughts can be evident in suitable circumstances, and then
infer the distinction of meaning. It is only from the various distinctions in meaning that
the indefinability of good is finally inferred.
The place in the reconstructed argument where inspection and intuition play a role is
where various thoughts are held to be distinct. If Frankena’s point was only that at this
point we meet a clash of intuitions, it might be true. But that would be to give up the
objection that the argument begs the question by assuming indefinability.
To maintain the objection requires showing that the intuition of distinct thoughts
assumes the indefinability of good. Evidently, that would be hard to do. It isn’t assumed in
any straightforward sense. The intuition that they are distinct is not itself an inference but
a piece of self-knowledge by acquaintance with the thoughts, a forteriori it is not an
inference from the assumption that good is indefinable. Indeed, the power of the
reconstructed argument is that it requires no thoughts about definability. I need have had
no prior thought on whether good was definable or indefinable, indeed, I might never
have thought about the question before. Nor need I make use of any thoughts about its
definability in following the argument. The argument draws my attention to token
thoughts and to whether they are distinct, and on reflection I find them so (or not). It is
especially clear in the earlier part of the argument (lines 9, 13 and 14 in the
reconstruction) that no assumption about indefinability could play a role, since the
distinctness is to be judged not on the ground of the meanings but on the ground of their
form. It is not quite so straightforward in the later part of the argument (lines 18 and 19)
since the difference in form doesn’t play the same role, but the intuition is still a matter of
acquaintance with the thoughts and their distinctness rather than involving thoughts about
indefinability. So even if Frankena’s question begging objection poses some difficulty for
Moore’s argument, it does not do so for the reconstruction.
We now turn to the objection given by Cornell realists (Railton 1986, Boyd 1988, Brink
2001, Sturgeon 2003). Moore assumes that the distinction of meaning entails a distinction
between properties. If, however, Frege’s distinction between sense and reference is
correct, that assumption is false since the distinction might be in sense rather than in
reference. So a naturalist might claim that the identity of good and a natural property is
synthetic rather than analytic.
There is, of course, a much wider discussion to be had about whether this synthetic
move is legitimate. It is plainly legitimate for the concept water, which is a natural kind
concept, but the concept of goodness might yet be one for which distinction of meaning
does entail a distinction between properties. So when the argument is over whether good
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is a natural kind concept, the assumption that there is a synthetic move to make is
potentially question begging absent some further independent argument. Here, however,
is not the place to pursue that line of thought.
A further issue is whether the claimed synthetic identity is reductive or non-reductive.
Cornell realists have sometimes been unclear which kind they are offering. For example,
Boyd claims to deal with the challenge from the open question argument, which he
articulates as
if goodness would be a natural property, then isn’t moral realism committed
to the extremely implausible claim that moral terms like ‘good’ possess
naturalistic definitions? (1988:§2.5)
His answer to this is that his example of synthetic naturalism, which he calls homeostatic
consequentialism, is non-reductive:
we have seen that a moral realists rebuttal to these challenges is possible
which assimilates moral terms to naturalistically and non-reductively
definable terms (1988:§4.5)
On the other hand, his homeostatic consequentialism looks as if it likens good to a
complex natural property, similar to the way health may be a complex, which could be
understood as asserting a reduction of good to that complex.
Railton, who is unquestionably a reductivist, explicitly states that his reduction amounts
to a reformed definition of morality in terms of a complex natural property. The non-
naturalist has a different kind of defence here, namely, the objection to changing the
subject.
I am not here attempting to rebut all threats from synthetic naturalism. The strongest
threat comes from non-reductive synthetic naturalism. The reason for this is that the open
question argument (if successful) rules out reductive synthetic naturalism because the
reduction is to a complex natural property and the open question argument rules out
complexity. Whereas, as Brink, Boyd and Sturgeon point out, the non-reductive synthetic
naturalist can accept the open question argument for indefinability and challenge the
inference from simple to non-natural.
The difference between non-naturalism and non-reductive naturalism can now become
difficult for the non-naturalist to sustain, since both agree that goodness is simple and
unanalysable and both agree that it supervenes on natural properties. Sturgeon’s attempts
to show that goodness (moral properties, in his actual arguments, but I’ll stick to goodness
for simplicity) has causal powers and is therefore natural.
Rather than rebut this objection here, I am going to grant the point so far as it goes, i.e.
that our reconstruction does not rule out non-reductive synthetic naturalism. In the next
section I show why a further move made by Moore would do so, if right.
7 Moore’s coda and the real objective
I have shown that section 13 contains three arguments, one against complexity, one
against meaninglessness and one against identifying good with some other simple
property. The arguments, at least as reconstructed, are essentially the same and the crucial
premiss in each is the non-identity of a pair of questions or propositions. The crucial
premisses are not argued for. Rather, the real thought move is providing us with the
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materials for realizing the non-identity from our knowledge of the identity and non-
identity of our own mental states. We are not assuming complete transparency since the
point of the real thought move is to assure us that a certain error we can be led into by
entertaining a sequence of verbiage is not occurring in this case.
I think it is important that Moore did not stop here. In the concluding remarks of section
13, that I shall call the coda, Moore makes an extraordinary move (a move that Feldman
does not attend to at all):
if he will try this experiment…he may become expert enough to recognise
that in every case he has before his mind a unique object, with regard to the
connection of which with any other object, a distinct question may be asked.
It has a distinct meaning for him, even though he may not recognise in what
respect it is distinct. Whenever he thinks of “intrinsic value,” or “intrinsic
worth,” or says that a thing “ought to exist,” he has before his mind the
unique object—the unique property of things—that I mean by “good.”
Everybody is constantly aware of this notion, although he may never
become aware at all that it is different from other notions of which he is also
aware. But, for correct ethical reasoning, it is extremely important that he
should become aware of this fact; and as soon as the nature of the problem is
closely understood, there should be little difficulty in advancing so far in
analysis. (1903, §13(2) my emphasis)
What he has said here (at least, as I propose to reconstruct it) is that by thinking of
intrinsic value, etc., we are acquainted in our thought with the simple property of
goodness. Furthermore, attending to the way he presents this, this is the objective that he
is really after. But it is not argued for. It is rather that the process of following his
reasoning has given us the material by which, if we will try his experiment and note the
correctness of the real thought move in each case, we may now realise this acquaintance
ourselves.
Bringing to our attention our already existing acquaintance with goodness is what I
shall call Moore’s real objective. With this Cartesian methodology, we transcend the open
question argument and learn that intuitionism about morality is possible because of our
acquaintance with goodness. I shall call this acquaintance with goodness and other moral
properties Moorean intuitionism.
That this is what is going on is clearer if we recall Moore’s view of semantics. Here I
follow Baldwin’s analysis in chapter 2 of his book on Moore’s philosophy. Baldwin shows
that Moore has a ‘one-level conception of meaning’ (Baldwin 1990, 45).11 Although
Moore changed the philosophical ground for this view between 1899 and 1901 (Baldwin
1990, 45–47), the one-level view itself remained the same. Moore rejects Frege’s
distinction between sense and reference (Frege 1948). There is no sense, no mode of
presentation, to be what is the ‘distinct meaning’ that is ‘before his mind’ when he thinks
of ‘“intrinsic value”’. There is only the referent itself, ‘the unique property of things that I
mean by “good”’. Under this view, the meaning of ‘good’ can only be goodness itself and
11 My thanks to an anonymous referee for pointing out the value of using of Baldwin’s analysis at
this point.
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so to have that meaning before our mind is to have goodness itself before our mind, and to
do so with an acquaintance sufficient to know its nature is distinct from that of pleasure.12
It is both striking and important that we find a contemporary philosopher committed to
exactly this acquaintance with properties. In his Defence of Pure Reason Bonjour gives
his case for a moderate rationalism for a priori justification. One example he uses of an a
priori justified belief is that ‘nothing can be red all over and green all over at the same
time’ (1998, 100). In chapter 6 he considers metaphysical objections to rationalism and in
§6.3 ‘The Nature of Thought’ he develops this entailment of his rationalism:
A person apprehends or grasps, for example, the properties redness and
greenness, and supposedly “sees” on the basis of this apprehension that they
cannot be jointly instantiated. Such a picture clearly seems to presuppose
that as a result of this apprehension or grasping, the properties of redness
and greenness are themselves before the mind in a way that allows their
natures and mutual incompatibility to be apparent (1998, 162, my emphasis)
In his replies to a symposium on his book he strengthens this:
it becomes clear at once that at least many…a priori insights are…of this
non-propositional sort. Consider the one involved in the color
incompatibility case. What is most fundamentally grasped or apprehended
there, I would now suggest, is the actual relation of incompatibility between
the two colors, the way in which the presence of one excludes the presence
of the other, with the propositional awareness that this is so, that nothing can
be red and green all over at the same time, being…secondary and derivative.
(2001, 677)
This is exactly the acquaintance that Moore is drawing to our attention, only in Moore’s
case he is setting it up in order to bring the properties of goodness and pleasure before our
mind in a way that allows their natures and distinctness to be apparent.
The suggestion I want to argue for here is that, understood in this way, Moore may well
be doing what a non-naturalist must do. Furthermore, part of the reason that it might be
what must be done is to do with the problem of distinguishing non-naturalism from non-
reductive synthetic naturalism whilst justifying a substantive realism for moral properties.
Non-reductive naturalism can explain how we have moral knowledge in the same way
any natural knowledge can be explained and the moral properties of which we have
knowledge have thereby the same substantive reality as any natural property.
Consequently, non-reductive naturalism justifies the reality of moral properties just as
naturalism in general justifies the reality of any natural properties, and hence has no
difficulties, or no special difficulties, in justifying a substantive moral realism.
Non-naturalists say moral knowledge is based in reason and that we know the
fundamental moral principles by the exercise of our rational intuition. The difficulty here
is to explain just how that amounts to access to substantively real moral properties.
Moorean intuitionism explains it by saying that we are acquainted with them and can
know of that acquaintance when we attend to our thoughts about them in the right way. To
12 Although Moore’s path here depends on denying Fregean senses, the acquaintance itself is
evidently consistent with distinguishing properties from concepts of properties.
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simplify matters a little, embarrassment at Moorean intuitionism has led non-naturalists to
appeal instead to the self evidence of fundamental moral principles (e.g. Audi 1997, ch.2
and Shafer-Landau 2003, ch.11) or to quietism (Parfit 2011, ch.31 and Scanlon 2014).
There is not space enough to go into depth here, but I am now going to sketch how
Moorean intuitionism may yet stand better than these current approaches.
A problem with a defence of the non-natural reality of morality on the basis of moral
knowledge got from self-evidence is that it does not achieve enough.13 We can fabricate a
collection of moral concepts arranged prettily, the principles of which arrangements will
thereby be self-evident, but morality itself might then be nothing but a castle built in the
air. Self-evidence cannot demonstrate more than this for the nature of morality and
consequently our moral knowledge might be nothing more than our knowledge of a
fiction. So this account of moral knowledge does not suffice to address the threat of
fictionalism. And there are further threats. If the fabrication is instead the manifestation or
constitution of some kind of practical agreement then we have constructivism. Perhaps the
best that can be made of it is a kind of mind-dependent conceptualism for moral
properties. But in all such cases, we do not have a substantive moral realism.
The other modern approach to establishing the non-natural reality of moral properties is
to be found in quietism, which is developed by Parfit is his Non-Metaphysical
Cognitivism:
(F) There are some claims that are, in the strongest sense, true, but these
truths have no positive ontological implications
(G) When such claims assert that there are certain things, or that these things
exist, these claims do not imply that these things exist in some ontological
sense. (Parfit 2011, 479)
So on this view, moral properties exist (because it is a moral truth that goodness exists),
but not in an ontological sense of existing. This is self-contradictory: to exist is to be and
the ontological sense of existence is being, so goodness has being and does not have
being, or more simply, goodness is and is not. The contradiction can be avoided if existing
only in the non-ontological sense of existing amounts to fictional existence, but I assume
that he intends ‘the strongest sense’ of truth to rule that out. I think Parfit is right that this
is where quietism must end up, but to end up here is to exhibit its failure.
So the non-naturalist must somehow show that those concepts are concepts of real
properties without ending up in a position indistinguishable from non-reductive synthetic
naturalism. The base properties of morality, such as good and bad, right and wrong, are
simple. If a simple property is not a property of which we may gain knowledge through its
role in a theory (as we may for natural properties) then all that can be done, after perhaps
some needed ground clearing, is to draw our attention to our acquaintance with the
13 For clarity, the self evidence in question here is supposed to suffice for moral knowledge
without the kind of acquaintance with moral properties we have been discussing. Rather, the
putative self evidence of a moral proposition requires only a possession of the moral concepts
sufficient for understanding it and understanding the proposition on that basis alone makes it
evident. One might call a moral proposition known by Moorean intuition self evident, but it would
be self evident in a different way, namely, because the acquaintance with the moral properties
makes their nature and relations evident. Bonjour appears to use ‘self-evident’ in the former way
(1998 §4.2) but later (as we saw above 1998 §6.3) he makes it clear that what he means by
understanding a proposition requires, at least sometimes, self evidence in the latter Moorean way.
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property. And that is exactly how we should reconstruct what Moore is aiming to do. Non-
naturalists must take it that we can be acquainted with moral properties and that as a result
our moral concepts are self-revelatory, in the sense of being concepts whose possession
allows, and is perhaps grounded in, acquaintance with the properties that are their
meanings.
We can now see why Moore is not much concerned with the issues for which Feldman
faults him. A substantive definition of good is a definition of what good is. On this
reconstruction, Moore thinks that we are already perfectly aware of what good is14
because we are acquainted with it and the clarity in that acquaintance will show it to be
the metaphysical simple that it is. In showing that ‘good’ is not synonymous with
anything else, there is no distinction to be made between its meaning and the ‘unique
property of things’ that goodness is. Admittedly, by immediately speaking of the property
as a notion he is failing clearly to distinguish the meaning of the concept from the concept
whose non-synonymy has been his subject. Nevertheless, he clearly thinks concept and
meaning are intimately united in our thoughts. And this is why proper reflection on our
thoughts will not only ground the main premisses for the argument but also, for those who
will try his experiment, reveal our acquaintance with goodness itself.
So my final suggestion is that Moore, at least as reconstructed here, may be quite right
in having this as the real objective of his demonstration. Modern non-naturalists,
embarrassed by the real objective, have sought to provide for the substantive reality of
moral properties in other ways. As we have seen, prima facie those ways do not
distinguish non-naturalism from fictionalism and lack any obvious additional resources to
vindicate the non-natural reality of moral properties. So if non-naturalism is to maintain
its distinction from a non-reductive synthetic naturalism whilst retaining the possibility of
moral knowledge of a substantive moral reality, then the coda articulates an important and
possibly unavoidable commitment of non-naturalism, namely, what I have called Moorean
intuitionism.
Moore was, therefore, more clear sighted than modern non-naturalists. Reconstructing
Moore’s coda shows Moorean intuitionism to be the real objective, an objective that is, as
we have seen, very much needed by the non-naturalist. Furthermore, having attained that
objective, we can look back at the reconstructed open question argument and see it to be
strengthened. All along, when real thoughts were brought to our attention, we were also
being reacquainted with goodness itself, and consequently our judgements of distinctness,
which gave us its premisses, were more strongly grounded than we had realized before.
For all these reasons, then, the open question argument and its coda as reconstructed
herein should continue to occupy our attention. That being said, whether Moorean
intuitionism is a congenial position for non-naturalism to end up in I leave to others to
determine: it might be as much a reductio of non-naturalism as the only possible
vindication.
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